

Message Text

PAGE 01 NATO 05342 01 OF 02 062041Z

67

ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00

NSC-10 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 SS-20 USIA-15

ACDA-19 IO-14 NEA-10 TRSE-00 SAJ-01 OIC-04 AEC-11

OMB-01 DRC-01 MC-02 /166 W
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P R 061820Z NOV 73

FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2531

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS 3421

AMEMBASSY VIENNA

USMISSION BERLIN

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 USNATO 5342

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: NOVEMBER 5 SPC DISCUSSION OF NEGOTIATED INSPECTION
MEASURES

VIENNA FOR USDEL MBFR

REF: A. USNATO (NOTAL) B. STATE 218212

SUMMARY: IN DISCUSSION OF GENERAL POLITICAL ASPECTS OF VERIFICATION PROBLEM, UK AND CANADA CALLED UPON ALLIES TO MAKE DETERMINED EFFORT TO GET SOVIET AGREEMENT TO EXTENSIVE VERIFICATION MEASURES. THEY DOUBTED THAT PRE-REDUCTION VERIFICATION OF FORCE LEVELS WOULD BE NEGOTIABLE, BUT FAVORED INCLUSION OF THREE WESTERN MILITARY DISTRICTS IN ANY ALLIED VERIFICATION PROPOSAL, IF ONLY FOR TACTICAL PURPOSES. SPC ALSO CONSIDERED OUTLINE OF EVENTUAL REPORT TO COUNCIL ON INSPECTION MEASURES AND MANDATE TO MBFR WORKING GROUP. UKREP POSED TWO QUESTIONS PRIVATELY TO U.S.

ACTION REQUESTED: REQUEST RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS IN PARAS
SECRET

PAGE 02 NATO 05342 01 OF 02 062041Z

5 AND 9 BELOW. IN ADDITION, MISSION HOPES THAT WASHINGTON CAN PROVIDE FURTHER GUIDANCE ON NON-INTERFERENCE WITH NATIONAL MEANS IN SHORTER TIME PERIOD THAN INDICATED IN PARA 3, REF B. WE BELIEVE THAT NAC SHOULD BE IN A POSITION IN THE NEAR FUTURE TO

PROVIDE FURTHER GENERAL GUIDANCE TO ALLIED NEGOTIATORS ON BASIC APPROACH TO VERIFICATION, STUDY OF SPECIFIC MEASURES AND POSSIBLE DETAILED WESTERN PROPOSALS WILL, OF COURSE, REQUIRE MORE TIME. END SUMMARY.

1. GENERAL POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS. SPC HAD INITIAL DISCUSSION OF BASIC QUESTIONS CONTAINED PARA 2A, REF A. UK AND CANADA BELIEVED THAT UNTIL IT IS SHOWN THAT VERIFICATION CANNOT BE ACHIEVED, ALLIANCE SHOULD NOT BE NEGATIVE BUT SHOULD PUSH VERIFICATION MEASURES AS FAR AS POSSIBLE. UK REP CONSIDERED THAT IT IS DIFFICULT TO JUDGE IN THE ABSTRACT HOW FAR RECIPROCAL MEASURES WOULD BE UNACCEPTABLE, AND ALLIES SHOULD NEGOTIATE TOUGHLY ON MEASURES IN U.S. OCTOBER 5 PAPER AND IN C-M(73)83. SOVIETS WILL BE ON THE DEFENSIVE AND ALLIES NEED NOT BE CONCERNED THAT SOVIETS WILL PROPOSE STRINGENT AND INTRUSIVE MEASURES WHICH SOVIETS THEMSELVES WOULD FIND UNACCEPTABLE. LONDON BELIEVES THAT GIVEN A CHOICE BETWEEN AN ADDITIONAL DEGREE OF VERIFICATION AND SOME DIMINUTION OF ALLIED DEFENSE CAPABILITIES, ALLIES SHOULD OPT IN FAVOR OF THE FORMER.

2. U.S. REP POSED FOLLOWING HYPOTHETICAL QUESTION: IF ALLIES ACHIEVE OBJECTIVE OF REDUCTION OF SOVIET TANK ARMY, WHICH SHOULD NOT BE DIFFICULT TO VERIFY, IN RETURN FOR SAY A THIN-OUT OF U.S. FORCES, WHICH WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR SOVIETS TO VERIFY, WOULD THE ALLIES BE AS INSISTENT IN ADVOCATING STRINGENT VERIFICATION MEASURES? CANADIAN REP RESPONDED THAT ALLIES SHOULD SEEK VERIFICATION MEASURES WHICH THEY CONSIDER APPROPRIATE TO SPECIFIC ALLIED REDUCTION PROPOSALS AND NOT BE TOO CONCERNED AT THE OUTSET ABOUT POSSIBLE SOVIET COUNTERPROPOSALS.

3. ON PRE-REDUCTION VERIFICATION OF FORCE LEVELS, CANADA, FRG, UK AND BELGIUM BELIEVED THAT, WHILE SUCH MEASURES WOULD BE DESIRABLE, THERE WAS NO PROSPECT THAT SOVIETS WOULD AGREE TO THEM. ALLIES SHOULD PRESS FOR SOVIET ACCEPTANCE OF THE PRINCIPLE OF VERIFICATION, BUT SHOULD NOT SEEK SPECIFIC VERIFICATION MEASURES BEFORE REDUCTIONS. UK ADDED THAT VERIFICATION MEASURES SHOULD, HOWEVER, BE NEGOTIATED AND INSPECTION TEAMS INSTALLED BEFORE REDUCTIONS ACTUALLY TAKE PLACE. U.S. REP CITED COVER NOTE TO OCTOBER 5 PAPER AS INDICATING CLEARLY U.S. PREFERENCE FOR LIMITING ALLIED PRESENTATION AT THE OUTSET TO THE NEED FOR VERIFICATION IN GENERAL TERMS AND TO PUTTING FORWARD SPECIFIC PROPOSALS ONLY AT A RELATIVELY LATE STAGE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS.

PAGE 03 NATO 05342 01 OF 02 062041Z

4. ON PUBLIC AFFAIRS ASPECT, CANADA, UK, FRG AND BELGIUM PREFERRED TO RESERVE JUDGEMENT UNTIL AFTER RETURNS ARE IN. EARLY WARNING AND VERIFICATION ARE IMPORTANT CONSIDERATIONS TO PUBLIC OPINION, AND ALLIES SHOULD NOT PRESENT ANY SPECIFIC VIEWS TO THE PUBLIC ON THESE ASPECTS UNTIL IT BECOMES CLEAR WHAT THE SOVIETS ARE WILLING TO ACCEPT.

5. ON AREA OF APPLICATION OF INSPECTION MEASURES, UK AND CANADA WISHED TO CONFINE MEASURES PRINCIPALLY TO THE NATO GUIDELINES AREA, SINCE VERIFICATION INSIDE THE NGA WAS MUCH MORE IMPORTANT THAN VERIFICATION OUTSIDE. FOR TACTICAL REASONS, HOWEVER, THEY BELIEVED THAT ALLIES SHOULD INCLUDE THE THREE WESTERN MILITARY DISTRICTS IN A VERIFICATION PROPOSAL. U.S. REP STATED THAT, AS WITH STABILIZATION MEASURES, THE U.S. HAD STRONG RESERVATIONS AGAINST BROADENING AREA OF NEGOTIATIONS BEYOND NGA. (COMMENT: WE WOULD APPRECIATE WASHINGTON'S CONFIRMATION THAT U.S. POSITION ON AREA OF APPLICATION OF VERIFICATION MEASURES IS IDENTICAL WITH THAT FOR STABILIZING MEASURES. END COMMENT) FRG, NORWAY AND GREECE SAID THAT AREA WOULD DEPEND UPON NATURE OF SPECIFIC MEASURES, AND THEY PREFERRED TO KEEP THEIR OPTIONS OPEN FOR THE TIME BEING. ITALY OPPOSED ANY EXTENSION OF MEASURES BEYOND NGA. BELGIAN REP WAS IN FAVOR OF BROADENING AREA OF APPLICATION, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THREE WESTERN MILITARY DISTRICTS.

6. UK REP OUTLINED HIS POSITION ON OPEN SKIES MEASURES. IN KEEPING WITH GENERAL BRITISH APPROACH TO SEEK EXTENSIVE VERIFICATION MEASURES, UK THOUGHT THAT ALLIES SHOULD GO FOR MAXIMUM DEGREE OF AERIAL SURVEILLANCE FREEDOM COMPATIBLE WITH AIR SAFETY. UK DID NOT SEE ANY DISTINCT ADVANTAGE IN A SEPARATE OPEN SKIES PROPOSAL, HOWEVER, AND BELIEVED THAT AIRBORNE VERIFICATION SHOULD COMPLEMENT AND BE LINKED WITH OTHER MEASURES.

SECRET

PAGE 04 NATO 05342 01 OF 02 062041Z

SECRET

PAGE 01 NATO 05342 02 OF 02 062042Z

67

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OMB-01 DRC-01 MC-02 /166 W

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P R 061820Z NOV 73

FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2532

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS 3422

AMEMBASSY VIENNA

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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 USNATO 5342

7. CANADA JOINED FRG (USNATO 5226) IN OPPOSING RELIANCE UPON MLM'S OR MILITARY ATTACHES FOR INSPECTION. OTTAWA FAVORS COMBINATION OF OBSERVATION POSTS AND MOBILE TEAMS.

8. WORK PROGRAM. U.S. REP NOTED THAT SOME OF THE QUESTIONS WHICH SPC AGREED TO ADDRESS AT OCTOBER 31 DISCUSSION (REF A) WERE DIFFUSE AND DIFFICULT TO ANSWER IN THE ABSTRACT. IN PARTICULAR, HE BELIEVED IT WOULD BE HARD FOR MBFR WORKING GROUP TO RESPOND MEANINGFULLY TO THE MILITARY-TECHNICAL QUESTIONS POSED BY SPC, WITHOUT CONSIDERING THEM IN THE CONTEXT OF SPECIFIC MEASURES. ON INFORMAL BASIS, HE SUGGESTED AN OUTLINE FOR EVENTUAL SPC REPORT TO THE COUNCIL AND FOR MBFR WORKING GROUP'S ANALYSIS OF SPECIFIC MEASURES. INTER-NATIONS STAFF WILL DEVELOP FURTHER PROPOSED OUTLINE OF SPC REPORT, WHICH COMMITTEE WILL CONSIDER AT NOVEMBER 8 MEETING. MBFR WORKING GROUP ON NOVEMBER 6 WILL DISCUSS FURTHER THE OUTLINE OF ITS WORK, ON WHICH MISSION WILL REPORT SEPARATELY. (COMMENT: MISSION EXPECTS THAT AT LEAST SEVERAL WEEKS WILL BE REQUIRED TO COMPLETE FINAL SPC REPORT, INCLUDING ANALYSIS OF POSSIBLE SPECIFIC NEGOTIATING PROPOSALS. THIS WILL NOT, OF SECRET

PAGE 02 NATO 05342 02 OF 02 062042Z

COURSE, PREVENT COUNCIL FROM PROVIDING APPROPRIATE INTERIM GUIDANCE TO AD HOC GROUP. END COMMENT)

9. UK QUESTIONS. UK REP CONTRACTED MISSION PRIVATELY TO CONVEY FOLLOWING TWO SPECIFIC QUESTIONS:

(A) HAS US REACHED ANY FIRM CONCLUSIONS ON WHAT THE ALLIES SHOULD SEEK IN THE WAY OF AN AIRBORNE ELEMENT IN VERIFICATION.

(B) DOES US HAVE ANY VIEWS ON SUCH SECURITY PROBLEMS AS MIGHT BE RAISED IN NEGOTIATION OF THESE MEASURES (I.E. WOULD SENSITIVE POINTS --AC 276-D(72)-- WHICH WE WOULD NOT WISH TO EXPOSE TO MEDIUM-LEVEL AIR RECONNAISSANCE HAVE ALREADY BEEN COVERED BY SOVIET SATELLITE PHOTOGRAPHY?)
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